Transfer Pricing

Saudi TP Business Restructuring and Compensation

Trace value, risk and actual conduct before deciding the tax outcome.

Updated 23 October 20264 min read

Part of Saudi Transfer Pricing: Scope, Pricing and Compliance

Regime
Saudi Transfer Pricing
Provisions
Bylaws3-9;Guide10; Guide10.1-10.2; Guide10.2.1;Annex15; Guide10.2.2;alternatives; Guide10.3; Guide10.4; GuideAnnex16; Bylaws14;Guide10

In brief

Assess Saudi TP restructuring, risk transfers, profit potential and compensation with ZATCA’s official examples and a practical implementation analysis.

Analyse the change in the business, not only the new contract

A business restructuring can change functions, assets, risks and contractual rights within a group. The transfer-pricing question is what independent parties would have agreed in comparable circumstances, including any compensation and the pricing of dealings after the change.

Chapter 10 of ZATCA’s Arabic Transfer Pricing Guideline, third edition 2024, applies the amended Bylaws’ arm’s-length framework to these changes. A group efficiency rationale can explain why a restructuring occurs. It does not by itself establish that each affected entity has accepted arm’s-length terms.

Describe the position before and after the restructuring

Sections 10.1–10.2 require identification of the actual transactions and the functions, assets and risks on each side of the change. Relevant arrangements can include converting a full-risk distributor into a limited-risk distributor, changing manufacturing responsibilities or moving valuable rights.

Identify the actual implementation date, contracts, people, assets and decision-making processes. Renaming an entity’s role while it continues to perform and control the same activities does not establish the proposed change in economic substance.

Dariba recommendation: prepare a before-and-after record that the business team can validate. Distinguish activities genuinely transferred from activities retained locally and identify any transition period during which the contractual model and actual conduct differ.

Establish whether the stated risks were ever borne locally

Section 10.2.1 requires examination of actual risk allocation rather than relying only on a contract. Control and financial capacity matter when assessing an alleged transfer of inventory or credit risk.

Official example: Annex 15 of the 2024 Arabic guideline considers a distributor contractually bearing bad-debt risk. In substance, another group company had already controlled credit decisions and debt recovery and met the unrecoverable debts. On the example’s findings, the distributor did not have that risk to transfer as part of the restructuring.

Dariba analysis: a before-and-after comparison must begin with an accurate before position. A supposed transfer cannot justify a profit reduction merely because a newly signed agreement describes risk differently.

Explain the commercial rationale and each party’s alternatives

The guideline recognises reasons such as scale efficiencies, specialisation, supply-chain changes and preserving competitiveness. It also notes that expected synergies may fail to arise and that a restructuring may seek to avoid losses rather than increase absolute profit.

The analysis of realistically available alternatives belongs at the affected entity’s level as well as the group’s. Consider its contractual rights, remaining business options, expected outcomes and any termination or transfer payment.

Dariba recommendation: preserve the decision papers, forecasts and assumptions prepared when the change was approved. A later explanation based only on the group’s tax outcome is weaker evidence of the commercial choices that were actually available.

Lower expected profit does not automatically require compensation

Section 10.3 expressly distinguishes a decline in future profit potential from a transaction giving rise to an arm’s-length payment. Examine whether something of value was transferred or whether existing arrangements were terminated or substantially renegotiated on terms for which independent parties would expect compensation.

There is no universal exit charge equal to all future profit lost. Equally, the absence of a separately registered asset does not prove that no valuable right or business moved.

Dariba analysis: identify the relevant property, activity or contractual right first. Then assess the independent-party position and value. Starting with a desired compensation amount and constructing a transfer around it reverses the analysis.

Review termination rights, costs and who should bear them

Section 10.4 begins with the legal and contractual arrangements, including termination, renegotiation and notice provisions. It then asks whether those terms and the resulting allocation of costs are consistent with the arm’s-length principle.

Restructuring may produce asset write-offs, employment costs, conversion expenditure and lost opportunities. None automatically proves that the Saudi entity must bear every cost or that the parent must reimburse every item.

Dariba recommendation: identify the contractual and commercial basis for each material payment or retained cost, including who benefits and what alternatives existed. Compensation and the pricing of future services should fit together without counting the same contribution twice.

Use prospective evidence when evaluating the new return

Official example: Annex 16 compares a distributor’s existing position with a proposed limited-risk arrangement producing an illustrative 2% annual return. Its three cases show why expected future outcomes, risk tolerance and alternatives affect whether an independent distributor would accept the change and whether additional compensation is needed.

The 2% is an assumption in the example, not a Saudi safe harbour. The discussion also explains why historical profit alone can mislead when competition, technology or customer preferences have changed materially.

Dariba analysis: an apparently lower margin may still be commercially reasonable if the party genuinely relinquishes material downside risk. The conclusion requires evidence of what changed and the value of the alternatives, rather than a comparison of two percentages in isolation.

Implement and disclose the model consistently

Article 14 of the Bylaws includes restructuring information in TP disclosure. Supporting documentation should explain the transaction, the compensation analysis and how the post-change method reflects the actual functions and risks.

Revisit the model after implementation. Confirm that decision-making, assets, costs and contractual obligations moved as expected. Differences should be investigated and reflected in the analysis, rather than ignored to preserve the original target margin.

Read the intangibles guide where technology or other rights are involved. Any CIT, Zakat, VAT or withholding consequence needs its own applicable rule; a TP conclusion does not provide a general exemption under another regime.

Key takeaways

  1. Compare the business before and after the actual change.
  2. Establish whether the stated risk was genuinely borne locally.
  3. Group efficiencies do not settle each entity’s arm’s-length terms.
  4. Reduced expected profit does not automatically create compensation.
  5. Termination rights and realistically available alternatives matter.
  6. The new operating model must reflect actual conduct.

Sources

Free toolTransfer Pricing Assessment
Read nextSaudi TP Year-End Adjustments and Implementation

General information only. Actual supplies, facts, applicable periods and controlling Arabic legislation determine the result. Official examples are distinguished from Dariba analysis and original illustrations. Seek advice or clarification where the arrangement or source material leaves a specific issue unresolved.